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Introduction
The established manually controlled rendezvous and docking (RVD) system considered in this paper is composed of target spacecraft, chaser spacecraft, astronauts, sensor, and thrusters [1] . The orbit control and attitude control are completed by astronauts and controllers respectively. During the rendezvous process, astronauts can adjust positions and velocities of the chaser according to the relative information obtained from various sensors systems in order to achieve the final docking [2] .
The modeling and analysis methods of man-in-loop dynamics system can be classified into the analytical method [3] [4] [5] [6] and the experimental method [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Due to the safety concerns of astronauts, the fault experiment cannot be conducted in the real environment. Thus, the combined method of the experimental and analytical method is introduced to study the astronauts' operation under circumstances where there is a fault present.
Inverse Simulation (IS) is a technique to determine the required control inputs needed to achieve specified desired response, the aim of which is to calculate the required inputs of certain maneuvers, for example, the stick operation of the pilots [13] . Inverse simulation in the helicopter design stage is called "desk top flight test" [14] , as it can simulate some specific testing flight and obtain the pilot's operations using models and some experimental data. This technique can be regarded as a method that combines experiment with analysis and is different from traditional simulation methods, in that it can acquire more flight information than open-loop or off-line design simulation methods [14, 15] . In the previous research, an IS has been proved to reproduce the astronaut's operation successfully [16] , while this paper aims at investigating the possibility of IS in analyzing the handling qualities in faulty conditions. After considering precision, efficiency, and stability of different algorithms [17] [18] [19] [20] , the model predictive control (MPC) [21] structured IS technique is chosen for the thruster fault simulation of the manually controlled RVD. Based on the simulation results, the operational strategy and the tolerance border of the system are studied and the thruster configuration is further designed.
Considerable research activities in Spacecraft design has been concerned with the configuration design of thrusters. As early as 1969, Crawford [22] proposed the linear programming method to design the time minimum and fuel minimum configurations. Then, Hwang et al. [23] designed the upper loaded stage using particle swarm optimization to gain the biggest achievement of control commands. Wang et al. [24] proposed an index representing for the limitation of control ability as a design factor for the thruster configuration. Moreover, there are some other investigations about redundant online allocation [25] [26] [27] [28] and coupling control with limited thrusters [29] .
Configuration design not only includes the installing positions and orientations of thrusters but also the choice of the thruster type and control allocation strategy. The focus of this paper is the improvement of initial designed configuration in order to make RVD system resistant to the thruster faults. Wiktor [30] proposed the concept of minimum control authority and proved that the configuration is sufficient to the control mission when the amplitudes of the disturbing force and moment are in the limitation of the minimum control authority. However, there are some other cases when the mission is still controllable with the disturbance out of the limitation. In these cases, astronauts sometimes can still complete the mission by some specific compensations even though the disturbing force and moment caused by the fault thruster are beyond the minimum control authority. The manually controlled system has the characters of robustness, discreteness, nonlinearity, and uncertainty.
Traditional methods using eigenvalues analysis and stability criterions are too complex for this system to determine the border of controllable disturbance. One effective way to solve this problem is to simulate directly to find the mechanism behind the mission failure. According to the IS results, the modified configuration can be proposed to improve the system resistance to the thruster fault.
This paper describes the application of IS to the analysis of thruster configuration through the following structure:
In the second section, the RVD model and attitude controller are established and then are integrated into RVD IS system; the third section introduces the original configuration and the fault modes of thrusters, and interprets the operation strategy and the physical workloads under both single-axis fault and multi-axis fault; in the fourth section，the modified configuration is proposed and verified according to fault simulation results; the last section concludes all the research findings of this paper.
RVD dynamics and kinematics modeling
The coordinate systems and parameters used in this paper are shown in Fig. 1 . p refers to the vector from target mass center to chaser mass center. ps refers to the installing vector of the sensor. pt refers to the vector from the measurement center to the target mass center. The Hill coordinate system is defined with zh-axis orienting to the earth center, xh-axis orienting to the velocity, and yh-axis submitted to right hand regulation. All axes of body coordinate system are orienting to the body main axes. zr-axis of measurement coordinate system is in the same direction of yr-axis in body coordinate system. The directions of xr-axis and yr-axis are opposite to the directions of xb-axis and zb-axis, respectively. , , and  refer to the attitude parameters. az and el are the angles of the view.
Without any assumptions, the relative dynamics equations [2] 
where af refers to the components of acha -atar in the Hill coordinate system; x, y, and z refer to the relative positions; Rtar refers to the distance vector between the target and the earth center; μ is the gravity constant; ωtar is the angular velocity of the target orbit. Given the assumptions that the earth is spherical and uniform (i.e. without consideration of gravity disturbance), the target travels around the near circle orbit, and the distance between the two spacecraft is far less than the orbit radius. Eq.(1) can then be simplified as 
where u refers to the component of the control input in the Hill coordinate system. The above equations, according to the state function form, can be transformed into
where  (t, t0) is the state transforming matrix and u (t, t0) is the input transforming t t 
where =t=t-t0, s=sin ωtar, and c=cos ωtar.
Assumed that the inputs are constant in , Eq. (3) can be modified into
where 
The expected control input vector u * can be expressed in the Hill coordinate system as ( , , )
where Cbh refers to the transform matrix from the body coordinate system to the Hill coordinate system. The equation can be further simplified when ignoring the second order small quantities as
The attitude dynamics equations are generally given by
where I is the rotational inertia matrix, M is the external moment vector, and ω is the relative angular velocity vector. Each axis of body coordinate system is along the direction of principle axis of inertia. The components of kinematics equations are then given as 1 0 sin 0 0 cos cos sin ( , , ) 0 sin cos cos 0
The coordinates of the target mass center Oh in the measurement coordinate system Or -XrYrZr are set to (xt, yt, zt), and then the slope distance of the target mass center , azimuth az, and elevation el can be calculated from t el az t el az t el cos cos , cos sin , sin
The vector from target mass center to the chaser mass center p, the installing vector of sensor ps, and the vector from the measurement center to the target mass center pt connect from end to end, i.e. p + pt + ps = 0, which is shown in Fig.1 . The components of the above equation can be given by
where Ctb is the transforming matrix from measurement coordinate system to body coordinate system. Substitute Eq. (12) into Eq. (13) and ignore the two order small quantity, the relationship between measurement parameters and the relative motion state can then be expressed as
Eq. (14) can be used to determine the actual azimuth and elevation angle, which is shown as below According to the maximum azimuth |az|max and elevation |el|max, and the maximum attitude error ||max and ||max, the maximum offset |y * | and |z * | can be expressed as
where the ranges of the attitude error ||max and ||max are pre-designed according to the docking requirements. Eq.(16) can be used to determine maximum lateral offsets and the RVD corridor is then determined. The target within the corridor stays in the sensor view even if the attitudes reach the maximum values.
The attitudes are controlled by the automatic control scheme, as detailed in Appendix A. Meanwhile astronauts should cooperate with the automatic controller to keep the chaser in the limitation of the largest lateral offset.
Inverse simulation method in RVD
The IS method used here has a similar structure to MPC. The inverse link, the IS steps, and the forward simulation steps in the IS method are regarded as the predictive model [20] ，the receding horizon, and control period in MPC, respectively. The main difference of outcomes between IS and MPC is whether the control outputs in one receding horizon are constant or not. The outputs of the inverse loop are constant, while MPC chooses the first control signal of the optimized sequences in every loop as the control input. Thus, the MPC structured IS technique retains properties of MPC to achieve the online and multi-variable control. At the same time, properly simplified an inverse model with the high-order forward model can obtain precise results and improve the simulation efficiency [20] .
The structure of IS includes IS link, forward simulation link, measurement link, and data offered link, shown in Fig. 3 . In this IS structure, the internal loop is IS, and the forward simulation and measurement link belong to the external loop. The current state of spacecraft x(t+t)
is produced by the external loop and transmitted to the internal loop through the measurement link. The expected state x(t+nt) * is produced from the experimental data or the designed guidance law. The term nt refers to the n numbers of IS step t.
The desired control input u* can be calculated according to the current forward simulation results x(t+t) and the desired states x(t+nt) * . The continuous control signal is then discretized using the pulse width pulse frequency theory, as detailed in Appendix B. Then, the discrete control input is passed into the forward simulation link to start the next simulation loop.
According to the numbers of dimensions of inputs and outputs, the control inputs calculation can be classified into normal, sufficient and insufficient problems depending on that the dimension of the input is equal, bigger or smaller than that of the output. To establish a general IS structure, a uniform formulation of these three kinds of problems is required. The state function in one step can be given by
where (t) refers to the predicted value in one step. If the inputs keep constant in one step (t-t0), the equation above can be expressed as
For the normal equations, u(k) can be calculated directly, while the sufficient and insufficient equations should be calculated as the follow steps. The IS is to find the most suitable input to get the minimum cost function J between expected and predicted states, i.e. where x refers to the predicted state of the input within one receding horizon, xc refers to the expected state, Q refers to the coefficient matrix reflecting the weighs of different components of states. Eq.(19) is discretized to
The solution of the sufficient and insufficient equations can both be calculated to get the minimum of J(u(k)). According to the pseudo-inverse theory, the weighed minimal norm least square solution is given by
Verification is conducted by the independently developed 9 degrees of freedom manually controlled RVD experiment platform in National University of Defense
Technology [31] . The platform utilizes the console to record all the operations and motion states data during the process. The experimental data can be used as the input of the IS, and the results are compared with recorded operational data to verify the established IS model [32] .
Application of IS structure in RVD
Same as the aircraft, during the approaching phase of RVD, the spacecraft sometimes need to be manually controlled to achieve some specific translational motion (or the rotational motion at the same time). In the manually controlled RVD system, astronauts are replaced by the inverse model. Given out the desired mission trajectories of RVD, the simulation result is then calculated using inverse simulation technology, shown as Fig. 3 . The applications of IS on RVD system fall into two aspects. One application is the initial handling qualities assessment (details can be seen in [33] ). The other application is the failure effect analysis and allocation design.
Few research concerned about the manually controlled strategy under the failure circumstance and the further allocation design. The process of the allocation design can be illustrated in Fig. 4 . When some of the actuators broke down, the inverse model was utilized to control the spacecraft to move along the desired trajectory. According to the pulse amounts, operation strategies for astronauts to complete the mission can be concluded.
The allocation of the thruster can then be further reconfigured against different failure scenarios.
3 Failure mode and effects analysis
Original configuration and failure modes
The thruster used in the mission is an electromagnetic-type actuator. The coil current lifts the flow valve to jet the propellant [34, 35] . Failures in any link could cause a thrust error. The covering strategy is to shut down the detected faulty thrusters.
Thus, the thrust fault is equally abrupt and permanent. All the faults mentioned later mean the thrusts descent to zero. The original arrangement is shown in Fig. 5 , which is composed of one orbit maneuver engine; six bidirectional attitude control thrusters:
a, a~, b, b~, c, c~; and twelve unidirectional translational control thrusters: d1, d1~, d2, d2~, e1, e1~, e2, e2~, f1, f1~, f2, f2~. The switching signal is designed according to the configuration. The logical relationships between switching signals and control signals are shown in Table 1 . 
There are two operational states for unidirectional thruster in the table, i.e. 0 refers to thruster closing and 1 refers to thruster opening. The attitude control thrusters have three operational states i.e. -1 refers to the negative direction opening, 1 refers to the positive direction opening, and 0 refers to thruster closing. The opening signal of each thruster is determined once the configuration and the control signal are defined.
This paper considers the faults in the orbit control thrusters as it relates to the astronaut's operation directly. When all the thrusters in any axis are broken down, the chaser must run in the passive or active modes to avoid flying into the forbidden zone [36] [37] [38] . The other faulty cases when the astronauts can still achieve the docking with the remaining thrusters are mainly discussed here. The error modes can be separated into single-axis error, multi-axis error based on the axis or into one thruster error, two thrusters error and so on based on the numbers of faulty thrusters. Table 2 gives out the error modes of orbit control thrusters in three axes, × refers to the error and ○ refers to the normal work. Table 2 Error modes of orbit control thrusters in three axes.
x-axis Orbit Control
The operational amount is given to represent for the control compensatory degree of astronauts to complete the mission which is an index to indicate the complexity, energy consumption, and risk degree of the mission [10] . The more fuels are consumed, the more operations should be executed. The operational amount is defined as the ratio of control pulse amounts to basic pulse amounts, which is expressed as
where Pthrust is the basic thruster amount, P refers to the actual pulse amounts.
Single-axis fault analysis
IS is utilized to simulate the handling controlled RVD along the designed trajectories for inspecting the operational strategy in different error modes. The simulation setting configuration and initial conditions are listed in Table 3 . The motion in the y-axis is decoupled with the other axes. Comparing with the other axes, the decoupled motion is only affected by the thruster of the y-axis and the regulation of the fault effect is more obvious. Thus, the operational strategy of fault thrusters in the y-axis is mainly analyzed here. All the other cases will be listed at the end of this part. Fig. 7 shows the attitude and measurement angles in the y-axis. The single thruster fault occurs in thruster e1~，while the double thrusters faults occur in thruster e1 and thruster e1~. The failure of e1~ can cause the disturbing positive moment in the z-axis and the reduction of the forward thrust in the y-axis. With the original configuration in Fig 5, the yaw will be increased by the positive disturbing moment and revised by the attitude controller. When t=800s, the motion in x-axis enters the index damping phase as shown in Fig. 7 , and then the x-axis thrusters keep opening forward. Table 4 indicates that the astronauts should increase the impulse compensation to overcome the effects of thruster failures.
When thrusters e1 and e1~ break down, z-axis positive moment and decreasing single thruster breaks down, one can consider shutting down a thruster in the opposite direction to produce the symmetrical effects. However, the compensatory effect of double thruster failures in the y-axis is more than that of single thruster failure, i.e. the physical workloads of the operator will definitely be increased. Fig. 8 shows the attitude and measurement angles in the y-axis. Fig. 8 (a) shows the results of shutting down in thrusters e2 and e1~, and Fig. 8 (b) shows the results of shutting down in thrusters e1 and e2~. The thrust magnitude of both directions in the y-axis reduces from 120 N to 60 N. the coupling effects from x-axis will affect y-axis more severely. Figure. 8 (a) shows that the failures of e2 and e1~ can cause the coupling effects on the positive offset in the y-axis and azimuth decrease, while Figure. 8 (b) shows the failures of e1 and e2~ can cause the coupling effects on negative offset in y-axis and azimuth increase. The physical workloads of the same side and different side failures are equivalent.
According to Eq. (22), the physical workloads and the operational amount of different error modes are calculated and listed in Table 4 . Table 4 Operational amount of the single-axis thruster fault.
z-axis fail down. According to the definition of risk in Ref. 35 , the risk is herewith determined by the compensatory amount of the thruster failure, in other words, the larger physical workloads refer to the more severe faults. Thus, the degree of risks can be ranked from the minimum to maximum as: single x-axis fault, double x-axis faults, single y-axis fault, single z-axis fault, and double y-axis faults. Double z-axis faults are the most severe errors. Eq. (2) can also indicate that y-axis motions in the Hill coordinate system are decoupled with the other two axes, but the z-axis motions are effected by the gravity and motions in the x-axis. Thus, faults in z-axis thrusters are much more serious.
Multi-axis fault analysis
When there are errors in more than one axis, due to the limited attitude control abilities, the astronauts cannot promise the successful completion. In the original configuration, the x-axis and y-axis failures can both produce a disturbing z-axis moment, while the failure in z-axis can produce disturbing x-axis and y-axis moments.
Thus, the coupling of multi-axis fault mainly refers to the failures of thrusters in x-axis and y-axis.
Four multi-axis fault cases chosen from all the controllable fault circumstances are studied here. The shutting down thrusters are d1, d1~, e1, and e1~; d1, d2~, e1, and e2~; d2, d1~, e2, and e2~; d2, d2~, e2, and e1~. The simulation results of the four cases are shown below. The results of case 2 with the failures of thruster d1, d2~, e1, and e2~ are better than those in case 1. Faults in two axes will produce opposite disturbing moments, thus the moments produced simultaneously can counteract each other. After 800 seconds, the motion in the x-axis enters into the index damping phase and the thrusters keep opening negatively, which produces the positive disturbing moment to increase the azimuth and keep it positive. Case 3 is the situation with the failures of thrusters d2, d1~, e2, and e2~, which is opposite of case 2. At first, the negative acceleration in y-axis can cause a positive disturbing moment opposite to the disturbing moment caused by x-axis thrusters. Thus, the azimuth would not exceed its limitations. After 800s, the continuously negative disturbing moment decreases the azimuth and keeps it below zero. The physical workloads of all the multi-axis faults are listed in Table 5 including four uncontrollable cases. Table 5 indicates that the compensatory operations of multi-axis faults in each axis are equal to those in cases with the single-axis fault. The operational rate shows the physical workloads of controllable multiaxial faults are equivalent to those of faults in the z-axis. They have the same level of risk. When three or more thrusters break down in x and y axes, astronauts may not be able to achieve the mission smoothly and the RVD IS system becomes underactuated.
4 Reconfiguration based on risk classification
Risk classification analysis
The risk could be basically divided into the controllable and uncontrollable risks.
The controllable cases are further divided into small deviation and large deviation.
The previous results of fault simulations in single-axis and multi-axis show that the case with the single-axis fault is controllable, while the case with multiaxial faults may be uncontrollable. If the effects caused by thruster faults can be considered during the design stage, the configuration can then be improved to mitigate against failures. Risk classification of different multi-axis thruster faults is listed in Table 6 . Table 6 Risk classification of different multi-axis thruster faults.
Faulty Thrusters e1/e1~
Mz-/Mz+
Mz-/Mz-
e2/e1~
Mz+/Mz+ e2/e2~
The results of mission-oriented fault simulation show that the negative thrusters should be employed in both x and y axes at the beginning. Class I refers to the acceptable fault. Class II indicates that the same disturbing moments can cause a large deviation of the yaw and the azimuth. Class III indicates that the directions of disturbing moments caused by thruster faults in both directions in the x-axis are same as those of moments caused by y-axis thruster failure, the deviation can be even larger which directly leads to the uncontrollable results.
Further reconfiguration design
The risk degree shows that altitude control thrusters could not resist three or more disturbing moments in one direction Thus, the thruster configuration can be improved in two aspects. On one hand, to enhance the attitude controllability in the z-axis to resist the disturbance from the other axes, on the other hand, to reconfigure the thrusters to avoid the superposition of the moments.
To verify the two schemes, the case with shutting down of thrusters d1, d2~, e2, and e1~ is chosen as the comparative simulation case. The fault simulation results of the original configuration are shown in Fig. 13 . Scheme II is to reconfigure the orbital control thrusters in the x-axis and y-axis.to produce the disturbing moments in different axes.
Forward thrusters d1, d2 in the x-axis are reinstalled on the vertical x-o-z plane.
Backward thrusters e1, e2 in the y-axis are reinstalled on the vertical y-o-z plane. The modified configuration is shown in Fig. 15 . After the reconfiguration, faults of positive thrusters in the x-axis can produce the y-axis disturbing moments, and faults of negative thrusters in the y-axis can produce the z-axis disturbing moments. The x-axis and y-axis attitude control moments are larger than that of the z-axis. Thus, to adjust the thrusters undertaking most operational pulses in the positive x-axis and negative y-axis to produce the y-axis and x-axis disturbing moments respectively can decrease the disturbance in the z-axis. The simulation results of the comparative case are shown in Fig. 16 . conditions, the opening time of z-axis attitude control thrusters in Scheme II is found obviously less than that in Scheme I. It means the physical workload of Scheme II is less, and the scheme is much easier for the astronaut to grasp. Though the azimuth and yaw results of Scheme II within the limitation are little bigger than those with Scheme I, Scheme II cost much fewer fuels to complete the mission. This reflects the trad-off between fuels cost and the precisions. More fuels indicate the less room for effective load and astronauts may feel pressure in the faulty condition, so it is worthy to abandon some precisions to ease the operation and save the fuels under the faulty conditions. In conclusion, Scheme II is superior to Scheme I.
Conclusions
Few configuration designs considering the control effect under faulty conditions compare with those focused on the maximum achievement. However, the risk resistance ability is a critical factor for the high risk and high investment projects like manned space missions. Thus, given the unique advantages of inverse simulation in man-in-loop fault simulation，a manually controlled rendezvous and docking inverse simulation system was established to explore a new way to improve the control effect of original configuration under the faulty conditions.
The operational amount was firstly defined to reflect the operation of the astronauts, and based on which the operational strategy and risk grades under single-axis and multi-axis fault situations through inverse simulation were studied.
The rank of risk degree was given out and the physical workloads of controllable multiaxial faults were equivalent to those of the most severe single-axis fault cases with double z-axis faults. The uncontrollable case was actually caused by the disturbing moments from fault thrusters in the other axes, so the configuration should be well-distributed to avoid disturbances in the same axis or the control thrust of the most influenced axis should be improved. Based on the conclusion, two modified schemes were provided and verified. Both schemes can guarantee the uncontrollable cases against failure and maximize a tolerant number of faulty thrusters, trading off fuels cost and the precisions Scheme II is superior.
The successful implementation of fault analysis and reconfiguration indicates that inverse simulation can be utilized as a general tool for fault analysis and reconfiguration of the manually controlled systems.
